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Abstract
In a recent paper Robert Griffiths [13] has argued, based on the consistent
histories interpretation, that Hilbert space quantum mechanics (QM) is
non-contextual. According to Griffiths, the problem of contextuality dis-
appears if the apparatus is “designed and operated by a competent ex-
perimentalist” and we accept the Single Framework Rule (SFR). In the
present paper we will argue that Griffiths’ conclusion is untenable. Firstly,
we will argue that Kochen-Specker (KS) type contextuality has nothing
to do with the measurement processes nor the measurement problem —
solving this problem does not necessarily remove contextuality. Secondly,
that the consideration of counterfactual situations is endemic when rea-
soning by means of physics. Griffiths’ SFR amounts to an unprincipled
(or impractical) denial of this fact. Thirdly, that Griffiths’ demonstration
implies, as a direct consequence, that QM allows a Global Valuation for
all properties independently of the context. This would mean, not only
that KS theorem is false, but also that the SFR is completely unnecessary.
Finally, we will argue that quantum contextuality should be reconsidered
—instead as a problem that we need to escape— as a main feature of
the formalism which must be positively taken into account in order to
provide a coherent representation of physical reality and explain what is
QM talking about.
Keywords: quantum contextuality, Kochen-Specker theorem, basis prob-
lem, physical reality.
Introduction
Contextuality is one of the main features of Quantum Mechanics (QM), a fea-
ture which has been present since the early discussions of the founding fathers.
∗Fellow Researcher of the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. E-
mail: cderonde@vub.ac.be
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However, there is still today no consensus in the community of physicists and
philosophers who discuss the foundational problems of QM, about the exact def-
inition or the physical meaning of quantum contextuality. In a recent paper [13],
Robert Griffiths has argued that “Hilbert space QM is noncontextual”. Accord-
ing to Griffiths the problem of contextuality disappears if the apparatus is “de-
signed and operated by a competent experimentalist” and we accept the Single
Framework Rule (SFR). In the present paper we will argue that the conclussion
derived by Griffiths is untenable. Firstly, we will argue that Kochen-Specker
(KS) type contextuality has nothing to do with the measurement processes nor
the measurement problem —solving this problem does not necessarily remove
contextuality. Secondly, that the consideration of counterfactual situations is
endemic when reasoning by means of physics. Griffiths’ SFR amounts to an
unprincipled (or impractical) denial of this fact. Thirdly, that Griffiths’ demon-
stration implies, as a direct consequence, that QM allows a Global Valuation for
all properties independently of the context. This would mean, not only that KS
theorem is false but also that the SFR is completely unnecessary. Fourthly, and
finally, that quantum contextuality should be reconsidered —instead as a prob-
lem that we need to escape— as a main feature of the formalism which must be
positively taken into account in order to produce a coherent representation of
physical reality and explain what is QM talking about.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1, we provide a physical and
philosophical analysis of the meaning of quantum contextuality. In section 2, we
shall focus on the distinction between the basis problem and the measurement
problem. Section 3 introduces the definition of Meaningful Physical Statements
(MPS) and the need to consider Counterfactual Reasoning (CR) as a necessary
condition in order to provide a coherent physical representation of reality. In
section 4, we analyse and discuss Griffiths’ arguments against quantum contex-
tuality in terms of four main points presented in [13]. Finally, in section 5, we
discuss what should be considered as a problem (and what not) in QM.
1 Contextuality and Kochen-Specker Theorem
Griffiths argues already in the abstract of his paper that:
“[...] quantum mechanics is noncontextual if quantum properties are rep-
resented by subspaces of the quantum Hilbert space (as proposed by von
Neumann) rather than by hidden variables. In particular, a measurement
using an appropriately constructed apparatus can be shown to reveal the
value of an observable A possessed by the measured system before the
measurement took place, whatever other compatible ([B,A] = 0) observ-
able B may be measured at the same time.” [13, p. 174]
This definition of contextuality discussed by Griffiths in [13] is a widespread
generalization of the KS theorem which has become quite popular within the
foundational literature. We have traced this exposition of KS theorem back to
Peres’ excellent book Quantum Theory: Concepts and Methods [18, Chapter 7],
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where he presents this explanation of contextuality as a direct consequence of
the KS theorem. We leave a deeper analysis of this explanation for a future
work. For the purpose of the present paper it is enough to make explicit the
fact that this way of defining contextuality is a direct consequence of the KS
theorem. Thus, if the former is proven to be false, the latter must be also false.
According to Griffiths [Op. cit., p. 174]: “a substantial literature has accu-
mulated which would throw doubt on this or suggest the opposite on the basis
of various arguments related to the Kochen-Specker theorem.” Griffiths builds
up his argumentation against contextuality from the analysis and discussion of
four main points or ideas:
i. The idea that physical reality according to QM is not classical reality.
ii. The idea that in order to understand QM one needs to use the SFR and
abandon CR.
iii. The idea that one can “get rid” of Schrödinger’s cat through the SFR.
iv. The idea that contextuality can be discussed through the analysis of quan-
tum measurements.
We will return to a detailed analysis of Griffiths’ arguments in section 4. Before,
we would like to discuss in some detail the meaning of quantum contextuality
according to the Kochen-Specker theorem which is what Griffiths’ demonstration
proves to be false.
The general characterization of the idea of “classical reality” can be con-
densed in the notion of Actual State of Affairs (ASA).1 This particular (meta-
physical) representation was developed by physics since Newton’s mechanics
and can be formultaed in terms of systems constituted by a set of actual (def-
inite valued) preexistent properties. From a realist viewpoint, such preexistent
ASA is independent of epistemic measurements and observations —which have
the only purpose of “discovering” or “unveiling” such existent state of affairs.
However, in the case of quantum theory we have serious difficulties to interpret
the orthodox quantum formalism in terms of “classical reality”. In fact, we have
no set of adequate physical concepts that would allow us to understand what
is going on according to the theory. Indeed, an evidence of the deep crisis of
physical representation within the theory of quanta is the fact that more than
one century after its creation the physics community has reached no consensus
about what the theory is talking about.
There are multiple standpoints and strategies that have been adopted in
order to discuss the meaning of QM. For example, Fuchs and Peres [10, p. 70]
have argued, in a paper entitled Quantum Theory Needs No ‘Interpretation’,
that “[...] quantum theory does not describe physical reality. What it does
is provide an algorithm for computing probabilities for the macroscopic events
(“detector clicks”) that are the consequences of experimental interventions. This
1See [8] for a detailed discussion and definition of this notion in the context of classical
physics.
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strict definition of the scope of quantum theory is the only interpretation ever
needed, whether by experimenters or theorists.” This instrumentalist perspec-
tive is satisfied with having an “algorithmic recipe” that allows us to calculate
measurement outcomes from the formalism. As a consequence, there is no need
to supplement the theory with an interpretation that would conceptually explain
its relation to physical reality.
In contradistinction, representational realism stresses the idea that in order
to produce meaningful physical representations mathematical formalisms must
be necessarily complemented with networks of physical concepts. From this
viewpoint, it is simply not enough to claim that “according to QM the structure
of the world is like Hilbert space” or that “the quantum formalism predicts
the correct measurement outcomes”. That is not doing the job of provding a
conceptual representation of what is going on according to the theory. To explain
in physics is to provide meaningful conceptual representations of empirically
adequate mathematical structures. Thus, the task of the physicist and the
philosopher of physics is to produce theories that provide adequate physical
representations which allow us to grasp and understand the world around us
beyond the reference to measurement predictions and mathematical structures.
We all agree that QM has a rigorous formalism and is empirically adquate.
The challenge of representational realism with respect to QM is to find a con-
ceptual scheme which matches the orthodox formalism and explains what the
theory is talking about. In this respect, there seems to be two main lines of
research which attempt to provide an answer to this challenge. The first one
investigates the possibility that QM makes reference to the same physical repre-
sentation provided by classical physics; i.e. that it talks about an ASA. This is
the main idea presupposed, for example, by the hidden variables program which,
as noticed by Bacciagaluppi [2, p. 74], attempts to “restore a classical way of
thinking about what there is.” The second possibility is to consider that QM
might describe physical reality in a different —maybe even incommensurable—
way to that of classical physics. This possibility seems to be endorsed by Grif-
fiths [13, p. 174] who argues that many of the problems with the interpretation
of QM come from “the view that the real world is classical, contrary to all we
have learned from the development of quantum mechanics in the twentieth cen-
tury.” In relation to this debate regarding the conceptual meaning of QM, one
of the main aspects that divides the foundational community is the issue of
quantum contextuality.
Contextuality is directly related to the impossibility to interpret the or-
thodox formalism of QM in terms of an ASA [7]. This impossibility is some-
thing completely new in physics which has always dealt —at least, until QM—
with commutative structures. In classical physics, every physical system may
be described exclusively by means of its actual properties, taking “actuality”
as expressing the preexistent mode of being of the properties themselves, in-
dependently of observation —the “pre” referring to its existence previous to
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measurement.2 The evolution of the system may be described by the change
of its actual properties. Mathematically, the state is represented by a point
(p; q) in the correspondent phase space Γ and, given the initial conditions, the
equation of motion tells us how this point moves in Γ. Physical magnitudes are
represented by real functions over Γ. These functions can be all interpreted as
possessing definite values at any time, independently of physical observation.
Thus, as mentioned above, each magnitude can be interpreted as being actually
preexistent to any possible measurement without conflicting with the mathe-
matical formulation of the theory. In this scheme, speaking about potential or
possible properties usually refers to functions of the points in Γ to which the
state of the system might arrive to in a future instant of time. These points, in
turn are also completely determined by the equations of motion and the initial
conditions.
In QM, contrary to the classical scheme, physical magnitudes are represented
by operators on H that, in general, do not commute. This mathematical fact
has extremely problematic interpretational consequences for it is then difficult
to affirm that these quantum magnitudes are simultaneously preexistent (i.e.,
objective). In order to restrict the discourse to sets of commuting magnitudes,
different Complete Sets of Commuting Operators (CSCO) have to be (subjec-
tively) chosen. And here is where the mixing of the objective and the subjective
takes place. Indeed, the way to solve this uncomfortable situation within the or-
thodox approach is to include a subjective choice —of one context, between the
many incompatible ones— that reintroduces superficially the classical structure
at the price of erasing counterfactual reasoning. It is this ad hoc interpretational
move, what needs to be physically justified in case we attempt to provide an
objective realist representation of QM. Unfortunately, what many consider the
best candidate to account for this interpretational maneuver, namely, the prin-
ciple of decoherence, has failed to provide a convincing physical explanation of
the quantum to classical limit.3 Regardless of the many claims in the opposite
direction, there are serious doubts, specially within the foundational literature,
that decoherence is able to produce a convincing explanation —beyond practi-
cal purposes— of how a single basis is objectively chosen through the quantum
measurement process (see [6, 16]).
In QM the frames under which a vector is represented mathematically are
considered in terms of orthonormal bases. We say that a set {x1, . . . , xn} ⊆ H
an n-dimensional Hilbert space is an orthonormal basis if 〈xi|xj〉 = 0 for all
1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and 〈xi|xi〉 = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n. A physical quantity is
represented by a self-adjoint operator on the Hilbert space H. We say that
2Notice that even relativity theory is founded in the description of an ASA constituted by
‘preexistent space-time events’.
3As remarked by Bacciagaluppi [3], some physicists and philosophers still believe that
“decoherence would provide a solution to the measurement problem of quantum mechanics.
As pointed out by many authors, however (e.g. Adler 2003; Zeh 1995, pp. 14-15), this claim
is not tenable. [...] Unfortunately, naive claims of the kind that decoherence gives a complete
answer to the measurement problem are still somewhat part of the ‘folklore’ of decoherence,
and deservedly attract the wrath of physicists (e.g. Pearle 1997) and philosophers (e.g. Bub
1997, Chap. 8) alike.”
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A is a context if A is a commutative subalgebra generated by a set of self-
adjoint bounded operators {A1, . . . , As} of H. Quantum contextuality, which
was most explicitly recognized through the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem [17],
asserts that a value ascribed to a physical quantity A cannot be part of a global
assignment of values but must, instead, depend on some specific context from
which A is to be considered. Let us see this with some more detail.
Physically, a global valuation allows us to define the preexistence of defi-
nite properties. Mathematically, a valuation over an algebra A of self-adjoint
operators on a Hilbert space, is a real function satisfying,
1. Value-Rule (VR): For any A ∈ A, the value v(A) belongs to the spectrum
of A, v(A) ∈ σ(A).
2. Functional Composition Principle (FUNC): For any A ∈ A and any real-
valued function f , v(f(A)) = f(v(A)).
We say that the valuation is a Global Valuation (GV) if A is the set of all
bounded, self-adjoint operators. In caseA is a context, we say that the valuation
is a Local Valuation (LV). We call the mathematical property which allows us
to paste consistently together multiple contexts of LVs into a single GV, Value
Invariance (VI). First assume that a GV v exists and consider a family of
contexts {Ai}I . Define the LV vi := v|Ai over each Ai. Then it is easy to verify
that the set {vi}I satisfies the Compatibility Condition (CC),
vi|Ai∩Aj = vj |Ai∩Aj , ∀i, j ∈ I.
The CC is a necessary condition that must satisfy a family of LVs in order to
determine a GV. We say that the algebra of self-adjoint operators is VI if for
every family of contexts {Ai}I and LVs vi : Ai → R satisfying the CC, there
exists a GV v such that v|Ai = vi.
If we have VI, and hence, a GV exists, this would allow us to give values to all
magnitudes at the same time maintaining a CC in the sense that whenever two
magnitudes share one or more projectors, the values assigned to those projectors
are the same in every context. The KS theorem, in algebraic terms, rules out
the existence of GVs when the dimension of the Hilbert space is greater than
2. The following theorem is an adaptation of the KS theorem —as stated in [9,
Theorem 3.2]— to the case of contexts:
Theorem 1.1 (KS Theorem) If H is a Hilbert space of dim(H) > 2, then a
global valuation is not possible.
After having recalled the KS theorem we are now ready to add some physical
discussion. Some remarks are in order:
I. KS type theorems preclude a physical representation of the formalism in
terms of an ASA. If physical reality is conceived in terms of an ASA, then
it is not possible to claim that the quantum state, Ψ, describes an actual
situation irrespectively of the choice of a context. Not all observables can be
considered to be simultaneously actual (real).
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II. KS type theorems have nothing to do with probabilities. Going against a
common phrase —continuously repeated within the literature— that says
that “QM is a probabilistic theory” it should be clear that KS theorem does
not talk about mean values of observables —as it is the case for Bell inequal-
ities. KS theorem discusses about the definite values of quantum properties
[7, chapter 5].
III. KS type theorems have nothing to do with measurements. There is no
need of actual measurements for the KS theorem to stand. The theorem
is not talking about measurement outcomes, but about the preexistence of
properties. About the constraints implied by the formalism to projection
operators (interpreted in terms of properties that pertain to a quantum sys-
tem). Quantum contextuality cannot be tackled through an analysis in terms
of measurements simply because there is no reference at all to any measure-
ment outcome.
IV. KS type theorems have nothing to do with the evolution or dynamics of
properties. There is no evolution or dynamics considered for the KS theorem
to stand. The theorem makes reference to the possible values of projection
operators (interpreted as properties of a system) at one single instant of
time. There is no question regarding the evolution of such properties, it is
only their simultaneous consistent values considered from different contexts
which is at stake.
V. KS type theorems in a nutshell. Put in a nutshell, quantum contextu-
ality deals with the formal conditions that any realist interpretation which
respects orthodox Hilbert space QM must consider in order to consistently
provide an objective physical representation of reality.
2 Disentangling Orthodox Problems in QM
The orthodox line of research deals with a specific set of problems which anal-
yse QM from a classical perspective. This means that all problems assume as
a standpoint “classical reality” and only reflect about the formalism in “nega-
tive terms”; that is, in terms of the failure of QM to account for the classical
representation of reality and its concepts: separability, space, time, locality,
individuality, identity, actuality, etc. The “negative” problems are thus: non-
separability, non-locality, non-individuality, non-identity, etc.4 These problems
begin their analysis considering the notions of classical physics, assuming im-
plicitly as a standpoint the strong metaphysical presupposition that QM should
be able to represent physical reality in terms of such classical notions. But in
between the many problems that can be found in the literature there are two
unsolved problems which show the main difficulties of QM to provide an objec-
tive account of (classical) physical reality. The first problem relates directly to
4I am grateful to Bob Coecke for this linguistic insight. Cagliari, July 2014.
7
the issue of contextuality and is called the “basis problem”:
Basis Problem (BP): Given the fact that Ψ can be expressed by multiple
incompatible bases (given by the choice of a Complete Set of Commuting Ob-
servables) and that due to the KS theorem the observables arising from such
bases cannot be interpreted as simultaneously preexistent, the question is: how
does Nature make a choice between the different bases? Which is the objective
physical process that leads to a particular basis instead of a different one?
Once again, the BP is a way of discussing quantum contextuality in “negative
terms”. The problem already sets the solution through the specificity of its
questioning. The problem presupposes that there exists a path from the “weird”
contextual quantum formalism to a classical non-contextual experimental set
up in which classical discourse holds. If one could explain this path through
an objective physical process, then the choice of the experimenter could be
regarded as well as being part of such an objective process —and not one that
determines reality explicitly. Unfortunately, still today the problem remains
with no solution within the limits of the orthodox formalism. There is no
physical representation of the process without the addition of strange ad hoc
rules, unjustified mathematical jumps and the like. These rules “added by hand”,
not only lack any physical justification but, more importantly, also limit the
counterfactual discourse of the meaningful physical statements provided by the
theory (we will come back to this point in section 3).
A very different problem —sometimes also mixed and partly confused with
the BP— is the so called “measurement problem” which deals explicitly with
the superposition principle and takes as a standpoint a specific basis or context
—“framework” in the terminology employed by Griffiths.
Measurement Problem (MP): Given a specific basis (context or framework),
QM describes mathematically a state in terms of a superposition (of states).
Since the evolution described by QM allows us to predict that the quantum sys-
tem will get entangled with the apparatus and thus its pointer positions will also
become a superposition,5 the question is why do we observe a single outcome
instead of a superposition of them?
The MP is also a way of discussing the quantum formalism in “negative terms”.
In this case, the problem concentrates in the justification of measurement out-
comes. It should be remarked that the MP presupposes that the basis (context
or framework) —directly related to a measurement set up— has been already
5Given a quantum system represented by a superposition of more than one term,
∑
ci|αi〉,
when in contact with an apparatus ready to measure, |R0〉, QM predicts that system and
apparatus will become “entangled” in such a way that the final ‘system + apparatus’ will be
described by
∑
ci|αi〉|Ri〉. Thus, as a consequence of the quantum evolution, the pointers
have also become —like the original quantum system— a superposition of pointers
∑
ci|Ri〉.
This is why the MP can be stated as a problem only in the case the original quantum state is
described by a superposition of more than one term.
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determined (or fixed). Thus it should be clear that there is no question regard-
ing the contextual character of the theory within this specific problem. The MP
has nothing to do with contextuality.
Now that we have clearly separated these two different problems some re-
marks are in order. The mix of subjective and objective appears both in the BP
and the MP. In the first case, orthodoxy has argued extensively that in order to
recover a “classical set up” or “classical discourse” about properties (and learn
which properties are definite valued and which are not), one needs to choose
a specific context —and this is where the SFR of Griffiths enters the scene.6
But if the “choice” is not physically justified in terms of an objective process,
or the internal symmetries of the formalism, the definition of reality given by
the (chosen) subset of (the now) actual properties is obviously subjective —it
depends explicitly on the choice of the experimenter, or equivalently, in the em-
ployment of the SFR. The context (or framework) is not determined prior to the
choice of the experimenter, which means that the context cannot be considered
as preexistent. In short, an (objective) independent reality cannot be dependent
on a (subjective) choice. In the second case, the mix of subjective and objective
pops up in the choice of the recording of the experiment —as Wigner clearly
exposed with his famous friend. The problem here is the shift from the physical
representation provided when the measurement was not yet performed (and the
system is described in terms of a quantum superposition), to when we claim that
“we have found a single measurement outcome” which is not described by the
theory. Since there is no physical representation of “the collapse”, the subject
(or his friend) seems to define it explicitly. Here the mixture of objective and
subjective is due to an incomplete description of the state of affairs within the
quantum measurement process (or “collapse”).
To summarize, quantum contextuality and the BP deal with the incompati-
bility of sets of contexts or bases which are in turn interpreted in direct relation
to experimental set ups and definite properties. There is no measurement pro-
cess involved here but the question of how multiple contexts or bases can be
physically represented in accordance to the formalism of QM. In this case, the
experimenter enters the scene explicitly in order to choose a specific context. In
contradistinction, the MP deals only with the process of measurement within a
fixed experimental set up (or context). The experimenter enters the scene be-
cause there is no objective physical account of when exactly the “collapse” takes
place. What is important to notice for our proposes is that while the BP deals
explicitly with the problem of quantum contextuality (i.e., the relation between
bases or contexts), the MP deals with the problem of describing a situation by
means of a quantum superposition —always within an already fixed context.
Both problems are independent, the solution of the former does not imply the
solution of the latter and vice versa.
6As we have argued extensively in [8] this is not the case for QM, the choice of a context
does not transform quantum properties into classical ones.
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3 Two Necessary Conditions for Physical Repre-
sentation
In order to discuss and analyse physical interpretations of a theory one should
first agree with respect to what should be considered as Meaningful Physical
Statements (MPS) within that theory. Furthermore, the theory should be capa-
ble of representing physically the MPS it talks about. From a representational
realist perspective, this must be done not only in formal mathematical terms but
also in conceptual terms through the addition of appropriate physical notions.
Definition 3.1 Meaningful Physical Statements: If given a specific sit-
uation a theory is capable of predicting in terms of definite physical statements
the outcomes of possible measurements, then such physical statements are mean-
ingful relative to the theory and must be constitutive parts of the particular rep-
resentation of physical reality that the theory provides. Measurement outcomes
must be considered only as confirming or disconfirming the empirical adequacy
of the theory.
We must remark that MPS are not necessarily related to a closed and coher-
ent physical representation of a theory. MPS can be, in principle, predictive
instrumentalist or operational statements about specific physical situations. It
is in fact the task of both physicists and philosophers of physics to comple-
ment MPS with adequate physical concepts, allowing us to construct a coherent
representation of what is going on accoording to that theory.
TheMPS of Newtonian mechanics are different from those of Maxwell’s elec-
tromagnetism or Einstein’s relativity theory. For example, the statement ‘the
particle will fall with acceleration 9.8m
s2
’ from classical mechanics, is mathemat-
ically and conceptually different from the statement ‘the electromagetic field
produced by a charge q is Eq’ which pertains to Maxwell’s theory. Each theory
must produce not only its own specific MPS but also a specific set of physical
notions that allows us to properly represent them and explain what these state-
ments are really talking about. The paradox introduced by QM is that, even
though we possess a numerous set of MPS such as, for example, ‘the spin of the
quantum particle is + with probability 0.5’ or ‘the atom has a probability of
decaying of 0.7’, we do not possess an adequate set of concepts which allow us
to garsp these statements in the same way as we do in Newton’s mechanics or
Maxwell’s theory. Let us be clear about this point, in QM we do not understand
conceptually what is the meaning of ‘quantum particle’, ‘spin’, ‘atom’ or ‘prob-
ability’. When asked about such notions we can only provide a mathematical
explanation or recall the empirical success of the theory. This type of formal
or empirical explanation hides the fact that we do not know what QM is really
talking about.
For the representational realist, MPS necessarily pertain to a physical dis-
course which requires counterfactual reasoning in order to produce an objective
account of physical reality. Counterfactual Reasoning (CR) is used and analysed
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by different disciplines. In the case of logicians and philosophers, CR is stud-
ied in terms of Kripke semantics, or possible worlds semantics. Even though
this logical approach to counterfactuals has become popular in philosophy of
QM (e.g. [11]), it has never been popular among physicists in general. In fact,
physicists have always used counterfactuals in a rather (undefined) intuitive way
in order to discuss physical experience realted to an objective description of re-
ality. Let us provide thus a general definition of counterfactual reasoning which
attempts to consider the actual praxis of physicists themselves.
Definition 3.2 Counterfactual Reasoning: If the theory is empirically
adequate then the MPS it provides must be related to physical reality through a
conceptual scheme. The possibility to make MPS realted to an objective physical
representation requires necesarily a counterfactual discourse. MPS are not nec-
essarily statements about future events, they can be also statements about past
and present events. CR about MPS comprises all actual and non-actual physical
experience. CR is the objective condition of physical discourse.
CR is an indispensable element within a physical discourse which attempts
to discuss an objective representation of physical reality. Many of the most im-
portant debates in the history of physics have taken place in the imagination of
physicists making use of physical representation and counterfactual discourse.
In the 18th century, Newton and Leibniz imagined different physical situations
in order to draw conclusions about classical mechanics. At the beginning of
the 20th century, Einstein’s famous Gedankenexperiments in relativity theory
made clear that the notion of simultaneity in Newtoninan mechanics had to be
reconsidered, producing a revolution in our understanding of space and time.
During the 1920s Solvay meetings, Bohr and Einstein discussed in depth many
Gedankenexperiments related to QM. Some years later, Schrödinger imagined a
strange situation in which a (quantum) cat was ‘dead’ and ‘alive’ at the same
time. More than 50 years had to pass in order to empirically test the existence
of quantum superpositions allowing technicians and experimentalists to explore
amazing possibilities for quantum information processing. Also Einstein, Podol-
sky, Rosen and Bell had to wait till the 80s for Aspect and his group in order
to be certain that the hidden variable project —with which they wanted to re-
place QM by a “complete theory”— was not going to work out without giving
up either reality or locality. These few examples show the crucial role played by
conceptual representation and CR within the praxis of physicists.
If we assume a representational realist stance, the conceptual representation
must be capable of conceptually explaining the MPS produced by the theory,
it must also produce a discourse which respects CR. Without CR in physical
discourse one cannot imagine objective reality nor experience beyond the here
and now. For a representational realist, the power of physics is CR itself. It
allows us to state that “if I performed this (or that) experiment” then —if it is
a MPS— the physical theory would tell me that “the outcome will be x (or y)”,
and I do not need to actually perform the experiment! I know what the result
will be independently of actually performing the experiment or not. That is
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the whole point of being a realist about physics, that I trust the theory to be
talking about a physical representation of reality.
Physicists are accustomed to play with the counterfactual statements pro-
duced by a theory. CR in physical discourse has nothing to do with time, evo-
lution nor dynamics, it has to do with the possibility of representing objective
physical reality and experience. A physical theory allows me to make counter-
factual statements about the future, the present or the past, just in the same
way physical invariance in classical mechanics connects the multiple frames of
reference without anyone actually being in any of them. CR is the discursive
invariance with respect to any physical phenomena. In classical mechanics (or
relativity theory), we do not need to actually be in a specific frame of reference
to know what will happen in that specific frame, or a different one. We can
imagine and calculate what will happen in each frame, we can physically repre-
sent them to ourselves and translate what will happen in each of them through
the Galilean (or Lorentz) transformations. For a realist, that is the magic of
physics. Once we believe to have an empirically adequate theory, we realists are
committed to the representation provided by that theory. It is this trust which
allows physicists to imagine situations which escape not only the spatial region
in which they live —imagining for example what might happen with a distant
star or even a back hole—, but also the technical possibilities of their time —as
the previous examples clearly exemplify.
From the previous analysis, two necessary conditions for the physical repre-
sentation of theories can be stated:
Necessary Condition I. Every physical theory must be capable of producing
MPS which can be empirically tested.
Necessary Condition II. Every physical theory must be capable of produc-
ing a coherent counterfactual physical discourse by complementing the MPS
it produces with adequate mathematical and conceptual schemes.
4 Revisiting Griffiths’ Arguments Against Quan-
tum Contextuality
In this section we attempt to show that Griffiths’ arguments, which support the
main ideas discussed in section 1 contain several flaws, mainly due to multiple
shifts from the ontic to the epistemic level of analysis. The criticisms provided in
this section can be easily extended to several (supposedly) realist interpretations
of QM.
4.1 “Quantum Reality” Is Not “Classical Reality”
Griffiths argues that the “wrong assumption”, that QM talks about “classical
reality”, has led to the idea that QM is contextual:
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“How have so many come to [the] conclusion [that QM is contextual]? By
adopting, we shall argue, the view that the real world is classical, contrary
to all we have learned from the development of quantum mechanics in the
twentieth century. In particular, discussions couched in terms of hidden
variables typically assume that they are classical rather than the sort of
thing one might expect in a quantum mechanical world.” [Op. cit., p.
174]
As we have discussed above, KS theorem can be read as making exactly this same
point against classical physical representations of QM: because of contextuality
QM cannot be described in terms of a classical ASA kind of representation
—which is what amounts to “classical reality”. In this sense, KS should be
understood as an ad absurdum proof of the failure of the notion of (classical)
actual preexistence to account for what QM is talking about. The conclusion
that must be drawn is the following: in case we want to stay close to orthodox
Hilbert space QM, then projection operators cannot be interpreted in terms of
actually preexistent properties —which is what, as we shall see, Griffiths ends
up trying to do.
According to Griffiths:
“The way our approach avoids any conflict with the Kochen-Specker the-
orem is by denying Re [Realism about properties]. The claim that every
observable possesses a value at every time is, indeed, inconsistent with
a representation of quantum properties by subspaces of a Hilbert space.
Consider, for example, a spin-half particle. There are distinct rays in the
two-dimensional Hilbert space corresponding to Sx = +
1
2
(in units of h)
and to Sx = −
1
2
; also rays corresponding to Sz = +
1
2
and Sz = −
1
2
,
but there is no ray that can represent a simultaneous value of Sx and Sz.
Students are told, correctly, that Sx and Sz cannot be measured simulta-
neously, and they ought to be told that the reason for this is that there is
nothing there to be measured. The projectors corresponding to Sz do not
commute with the projectors corresponding to Sx, and once one has ac-
cepted the connection between quantum properties and Hilbert subspaces
proposed by von Neumann it makes no sense to speak of a spin half sys-
tem in which, for example, Sx = +
1
2
at the same time that Sz = +
1
2
.”
[Op. cit., p. 179] (emphasis added)
As we have discussed above, the condition Re is perfectly well founded in the
physical representation provided by classical Newtonian mechanics in terms of
an ASA (see section 1). Now, the fact that two observables do not commute
does not only imply that the observables cannot be measured together (epistemic
incompatibility of measurements) but more importantly, that one cannot assign
a Global Valuation to them (ontic incompatibility of preexistent properties) —
which precludes the possibility of representing what is going on in terms of an
ASA. In this respect, it is important to distinguish the ontic incompatibility of
properties from the epistemic incompatibility of measurements.
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Definition 4.1 Epistemic Incompatibility of Measurements: Two con-
texts are epistemically incompatible if their measurements cannot be performed
simultaneously.
Definition 4.2 Ontic Incompatibility of Properties: Two contexts are
ontically incompatible if their formal elements cannot be considered as simulta-
neoulsy preexistent.
The fact that even in classical physics we can find epistemically incompatible
measurement situations has been analysed by Diederik Aerts in [1]. Aerts dis-
cusses the example of a piece of wood which might posses the properties of being
“burnable” and “floatable”. Obviously, both properties are testable through mu-
tually incompatible experimental arrangements. Indeed, in order to measure the
“burnability” we need to burn the piece of wood, but then —becuase it has been
burned— it is not possible anymore to see if it floats. In order to measure the
“floatability” we need to put the piece of wood in the water, but then —becuase
it is now wet— its burnability cannot be tested. These two experiments are
epistemically incompatible.
However, the properties are not ontically incompatible, the epistemic realm
of measurements does not make any direct reference to the ontic level of prop-
erties. In fact, in classical physics, all properties can be thought to exist as
actual (ontic) properties. The formal Boolean structure of propositions allows
an interpretation of them in terms of an ASA. This example shows that epis-
temic incompatibility of measurements does not imply the ontic incompatibility
of preexistent properties. In fact, we know that all observables in classical me-
chanics can be regarded as ontically compatible due to the existence of Global
Valuations of all observables (or properties) pertaining to any situation. Go-
ing back to Griffiths claim, the fact that measurements cannot be performed
simultaneusly is an epistemic feature which does not involve a direct ontic con-
sequence. One cannot jump —if one is a realist— from an epistemic statement
such as “[quantum observables] cannot be measured simmultaneously”, to an
ontic conclusion such as: “then there is nothing there”.
Griffiths continues arguing that:
“It is somewhat odd that this particular principle [Re] should be identified
with realism, since at the present time all available experimental evidence
is in accord with Hilbert space quantum mechanics, and not with classical
physics when the two disagree. If a Hilbert space provides the appropriate
mathematics to describe everything from the quarks to the quasars, where
in the real world, the one we live in, is there any part that satisfies the
condition of ‘realism’ given by Re? It would be much less confusing if
whenever ‘realism’ were used in this way the adjective ‘classical’ were
prepended. The hidden variables of typical hidden variable theories are
classical hidden variables, and it is for this reason that the attempt to use
them for interpreting quantum theory has given rise to numerous conflicts
with the latter.” [Op. cit., p. 179]
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We completely agree with Griffiths that the realism presupposed within the de-
bate of quantum contextuality is in fact “classical realism”. However, we disagree
that one can, from a realist stance, argue only in terms of epistemic evidence.
That should be clearly not enough for a realist —like Griffiths himself claims
to be. What is lacking is not a formalism that accounts for measurement out-
comes. We already have that. What is lacking is a network of physical concepts
which provides a representation that coherently relates to such formalism and
explains what the outcomes are talking about. Just in the same way that in clas-
sical mechanics we understand that ‘a point in phase space’ (in the formal level)
relates to ‘a particle in Newtonian space-time’ (in the conceptual level), or just
like Maxwell’s equations (in the formal level) relate to electromagnetic waves
in space-time (in the conceptual level); we —representational realists— need to
explain in detail which are the physical notions (in the conceptual level) that
relate to the orthodox Hilbert space quantum structure (in the formal level).
Clearly, classical entities (e.g. ‘particles’ and ‘waves’) are not doing the job. It
is neither clear to the author of this paper that Griffiths’ consistent histories
interpretation is providing such non-classical representation of QM.
As we mentioned above, if one is a representational realist who admits that
having a formalism is not enough in order to provide a physical representation
of a theory, there seems to be two different paths to follow. Either we develop a
new (non-contextual) formalism that describes things in terms of an ASA (i.e.,
in terms of “classical reality”) as the hidden variables program attempts to do; or
we must find a new (non-classical) conceptual network which takes into account
all MPS in QM —even those of incompatible observables. Griffiths seems to
claim that the problem of describing quantum reality has been already solved
when he argues that: “Hilbert space provides the appropriate mathematics to
describe everything from the quarks to the quasars, where in the real world,
the one we live in”. On the contrary, for the representational realist, a rigorous
mathematical scheme and the empirical adequacy of a theory are necessary but
not sufficient conditions in order to generate a physical representation. Physical
representation also requires a network of adequate physical notions. Until we
do not find such appropriate physical concepts we will not be able to say what
QM is really talking about.
4.2 Applying the SFR (Instead of CR) in QM
In several papers, Griffiths —who is certainly not alone in supporting this idea—
has argued against CR in physical discourse [11, 12, 13, 14]. According to
him [13, p. 178]: “Analyzing counterfactual questions is a bit tricky even in
situations not entangled with quantum mysteries.” Indeed, this idea of CR
being something “tricky” or “weird” is quite widespread within the literature.
In order to escape the consequences of CR Griffiths proposes to “block” this
discursive condition in QM through the introduction of what he calls the Single
Framework Rule (SFR).7
7Equivalent ad hoc rules like the SFR are provided in many interpretations of QM. For
example, in the perspectival version of the modal interpretation proposed by Bene and Dieks
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“The single framework rule asserts that any sort of discussion of the quan-
tum system must be carried out in some framework of the sort just dis-
cussed, which is typically chosen because it has some events which are
interesting for some reason or another. The physicist is free to choose any
framework he pleases for describing the world; what the single framework
rule prohibits is combining frameworks. [...] The well-known Kochen-
Specker paradox is constructed precisely by forming a bridge, or one might
better say bridges, between incompatible frameworks in such a way that
one eventually ends up with a contradiction. The histories approach dis-
poses of the paradox by declaring the bridging invalid.” [Op. cit., p. 180]
(emphasis added)
To “declare the bridging invalid” amounts to declare that the CR commonly
used by physicists is invalid in quantum theory. CR is the discursive invari-
ance which allows one to claim that in case we performed an experiment the
phenomenon A will have the result a while the phenomenon B will have the
result b, and so forth. CR presupposes —according to the realist stance— that
there is an objective (independent of subjective choices) physical representa-
tion of reality according to the theory. The fact that we can talk about such
physical representation without the need to actually perform an experiment is
the very condition of possibility for objective (conterfactual) discourse within
physics. The bridging which Griffiths “declares invalid” introduces a choosing
subject and gives rise to the basis problem discussed above in detail (section
2). However, it is important to remark that the probabilistic statements of QM
do not require the choice of a context.8 The choice of the context is required
only in order to seemingly recover a classical (Boolean) discourse about definite
valued properties; or in other words, about “classical reality”.
Continuing his argumentation, Griffiths makes the point that:
“It is important to note that the single-framework rule does not state
that there is only one framework which can be used for a valid quantum
description of a situation. The quantum physicist is free to choose any
framework, consistent with the Hilbert space structure of quantum me-
chanics (and, in the case of histories, satisfying consistency conditions if
the extension of the Born rule is to be used to assign probabilities), in
order to describe a quantum system. In some frameworks a particular
observable A may possess some value, while in other frameworks it may
not. The existence of the latter does not preclude the possibility or the
validity of a framework which include the former. The single framework
rule is not a restriction on the use of frameworks; it is instead a prohi-
bition against combining incompatible frameworks.” [Op. cit., p. 180]
(emphasis added)
[4], in Bub’s bohmian version of the modal interpretation [5] or the contextual approaches by
Karakostas [15] and Svozil [19].
8Given a vector in Hilbert space, Ψ, the Born rule allows us to predict the average value
of (any) observable O, 〈Ψ|O|Ψ〉 = 〈O〉. This prediction is context (or basis) independent.
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Some remarks are in order. Firstly, objective physical representation involves
the need to be able to discuss of all contexts simultaneously. Properties of
different contexts cannot be brought into reality by virtue of a choice if we
want to claim at the same time that our representation of reality is not defined
subjectively. There should be no subjective choice in order to claim that a
given property is objectively actually existent or not (i.e., has a definite value
or not). Secondly, as we argued above, the ontological incompatibility of definite
values of quantum properties should not be confused with the epistemological
incompatibility of distinct measurements. Due to the specific questioning I might
not be able to perform two measurements simultaneously. As already remarked,
in general, not all properties of a classical physical object can be measured
at the same time. However —and this is what really matters— in classical
physics all properties in a given situation are consistent with possessing a definite
value; making it possible to understand any classical situation in terms of an
objective ASA. Due to the Boolean structure of classical mechanics, all classical
properties of a system are ontologically compatible. It is not the epistemological
incompatibility of measurements —to which Girffiths makes reference— which
is at stake in KS contextuality but the ontological incompatibility of the values
of properties which allows a Global Valuation —and consequently a description
in terms of an objective ASA.
Griffiths’ argumentation seems to be in tension with the argument presented
in the previous subsection. Griffiths now argues that the SFR should be used in
order to talk about “properties with preexistent values”. But this is exactly the
“classical” physical representation that Griffiths had firmly criticized. The SFR
seems to be an ad hoc rule only justified by the (supposedly) necessary import
of the classical discourse. Let us summarize. On the one hand, introducing
classical discourse has the only purpose to restore the classical representation
of physics in terms of definite valued properties. But this goes against Griffiths
earlier claim that QM cannot be described in terms of “classical reality”. On the
other hand, if QM would be non-contextual, as Griffiths claims to have demon-
strated in [13], the SFR would become completely unnecessary. These two lines
of argumentation seem flagrantly in contradiction. Why should someone who
claims that “QM is not talking about classical reality” impose ad hoc rules to
QM which have the only purpose of restoring a (classical) discourse about “clas-
sical reality”? Indeed, Griffiths seems to have created a paradoxical situation
for his own approach. If he is correct in claiming that “a measurement [...]can
be shown to reveal the value of an observable A possessed by the measured
system before the measurement took place”9 independently of the context, then
there would exist a definite value for all observables (since A can be any ob-
servable). But this is equivalent to saying that there exists a Global Valuation
for all properties independently of the context. This would prove KS to be false
which is an untenable result; since this theorem is a direct consequence of the
quantum formalism mathematically proved in many different ways (see [18]).
Furthermore, it would also turn Griffiths’ SFR completely unnecessary. On the
9[Op. cit., p. 174].
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contrary, if KS is correct, then Hilbert space QM is contextual and the value of
A will differ when measured together with B or C (with [B,A] = 0, [C,A] = 0,
but [B,C] 6= 0) [18, p. 196].
4.3 “Getting Rid” of Quantum Superpositions
In his paper, Griffiths [Op. cit., p. 177] considers the question: “What will
occur if the experimenter prepares an initial state |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|a1〉 + |a2〉) which
is a superposition corresponding to two distinct eigenvalues of a1 and a2 of A
and then carries out a measurement?” Griffiths argues that:
“[...] a properly constructed quantum measurement apparatus does just
what it was designed to do, measure properties of a system corresponding
to a particular decomposition of the identity. It will do this for a system
initially prepared in one of the states it was designed to measure, and
for one initially prepared in a superposition of those states. To discuss
the latter one needs to employ probabilities, in particular the (extended)
Born rule, both in order to have a measurement pointer with a well-defined
position, and to show that this position is appropriately correlated with
one of the properties the apparatus was designed to measure.” [Op. cit.,
p. 178]
In section 2 we made clear that solving the MP has no relation at all to the
solution of the BP or contextuality. The solution of the former does not imply
in any way the solution of the latter. A superposition is a particular mathe-
matical representation of a vector Ψ in Hilbert space which implies the choice
of a particular basis. The SFR cannot help in dissolving or doing away with
quantum superpositions because quantum superpositions are defined within a
fixed context (or framework). Let us remark this important point: there is
no quantum superposition composed by states which give rise to incompatible
observables. It is a mathematical fact which goes beyond interpretation that su-
perpositions are mathematical expressions within a fixed basis; i.e. a complete
set of commuting observables. The criticism provided by Griffiths to the many
worlds interpretation of QM also makes clear the fact there is a mix between
the MP and the BP in his argumentation against Schrödinger’s cat.
“[...] the histories approach is distinctly different from the Everett or
many-worlds interpretation with its insistence that ‘the wave function’,
in this instance the state onto which V projects, represents fundamen-
tal physical reality. From the histories point of view the difficulties which
many-worlds advocates have in explaining how ordinary macroscopic physics
can be consistent with their perspective is not unrelated to the fact that
they are seeking to assign simultaneous reality to properties which in the
quantum Hilbert space are represented by incompatible projectors.” [Op.
cit., p. 177]
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Contrary to this claim, many worlds focuses in solving the MP, and deals in
no way with incompatible projectors. The many worlds interpretation attempts
to provide physical meaning to quantum superpositions by multiplying classical
reality as many times as terms are found in a specific superposition (described
in relation to a particular context). The original solution provided by many
worlds to the MP does not deal in any way with contextuality nor the BP.
Finally, we should remark that a representational realist should not feel
uncomfortable with the non-classical features expressed by quantum superpo-
sitions. Instead of considering quantum superpositions in terms of a “mathe-
matical tool” that calculates pre-probabilities, she should be trying to develop
a coherent physical notion which is capable of making sense of this most impor-
tant formal element of the theory. If we suspect that QM cannot be represented
in terms of “classical reality”, then it neither makes sense to interpret quantum
superpositions in terms of (classical) definite valued properties. Something we
know is untenable due to the fact quantum probability cannot be interpreted in
terms of ignorance.
4.4 Measurement Process and Contextuality
The discussion provided by Griffiths continues calling the attention to the need
of considering the measurement process in the discussion about contextuality.
Griffiths then argues that:
“[...] getting rid of the ghost of Schrödinger’s cat, we still need to show that
the measurement apparatus actually carries out a measurement; i.e., the
outcome pointer position is properly correlated with a previous property
of the measured system. For this purpose we need an extension of Born’s
rule that allows probabilities to be assigned to a closed quantum system
at three or more times, and this in turn requires the use of consistent (or
decoherent) families of histories.” [Op. cit., p. 177]
Once again, the discussion is shifted to the justification of the measurement pro-
cess. According to Griffiths: “The most direct approach to determining whether
quantum theory is or is not contextual is to analyse the process that goes on in
a quantum measurement.” [Op. cit., p. 176] We have argued extensively why
this cannot be the case. Quantum measurements have nothing to say about the
contextual character of QM simply because contextuality says nothing about
measurements. From a realist perspective, (epistemic) measurements cannot be
considered as more fundamental than the (ontic) physical representation pro-
vided by the theory in terms of its mathematical structure and the physical
network of concepts. For a representational realist about physics, measurement
outcomes are only part of a verification procedure. As Griffiths himself re-
marks in his book [11, p. 361]: “If a theory makes a certain amount of sense and
gives predictions which agree reasonably well with experimental or observational
results, scientists are inclined to believe that its logical and mathematical struc-
ture reflects the structure of the real world in some way, even if philosophers
will remain permanently skeptical.”
19
5 The Contextuality Problem
The main idea behind the representational realist stance is that when a math-
ematical formalism is coherently related to a network of physical concepts, it is
possible to produce a physical representation of reality which allows us to de-
scribe particular physical phenomena. It is not enough to say that QM cannot
be explained in terms of “classical reality”. Neither is enough to argue that,
“according to QM the world has the struture of Hilbert space”. That is not
doing the job of explaining in conceptual terms what QM is talking about. QM
has proven already to be empirically adequate and the orthodox formalism is
mathematically rigorous. So instead of changing the formalism or adding ad
hoc rules in order to restore a classical discourse and representation, there is a
different strategy that could be considered.
According to this new strategy what needs to be done is to construct a new
net of (non-classical) physical concepts capable of interpreting the formalism as
it is. In this respect, contextuality should not be regarded as a “ghost” which
we need to fight or destroy, it should be accepted as one of the key features
that must help us in understanding the type of physical reality implied by QM.
Technological and experimental developments are going much faster than the
present discussions regarding foundational issues about QM. These discussions
seem to be still stuck by the limits imposed by “classical reality” and the “no-
problems” discussed in section 2. This is one of the main reasons we believe
that the field is in need of a strong criticism. The BP and MP which attempt
to build a bridge between QM and our classical understanding of reality, could
be replaced in the literature by new problems which accept the possibility of
developing a new representation of physical reality according to QM. In [7], we
put forward two new problems which could help us to think, from a different
perspective, the problem of interpretation in QM. The problem that interests
us here should replace the BP.
Contextuality Problem: Given the fact that Hilbert space QM is a contextual
theory, the question is: which are the concepts that would allow us to coherently
interpret the formalism and provide a representation of physical reality that ac-
counts for this main feature of the theory in a natural way?
Contextuality is a consequence of the mathematical structure of QM, a formal
scheme which has been allowing us for more than one century to produce the
most outstanding physical predictions. The feature of contextuality emerges
from the orthodox formalism of QM itself, it is not something external to it.
Unfortunately, instead of regarding quantum contextuality as a new interesting
feature of a new physical theory, many attempts in the literature have centred
their efforts in attempting to restore a representation of QM in terms of an
ASA. The consistent histories interpretation, just like in the case of the hidden
variables approach, also denies the formalism in order to restore a classical dis-
course. They do so, not by changing it explicitly —as in the case of the former—
but by adding unnecessary rules (e.g. the SFR) to account for the meaningful
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physical statements the theory already provides —without such rules. We be-
lieve that to deny contextuality just because it obstructs an interpretation of the
theory in terms of actual (definite valued) properties would be tantamount to
trying to deny the Lorentz transformations in special relativity simply because
of its implications to the contraction of rigid rods. Indeed, this was the attempt
of most conservative physicists until Einstein made the strong interpretational
move of taking seriously the formalism of the theory and its phenomena, and
derived a new net of physical notions in order to coherently understand the new
theory.
If we accept the orthodox formalism, then contextuality is the crux of QM. It
is contextuality that which needs to be physically interpreted, instead of some-
thing that needs to be destroyed because of its non-classical consequences. The
contextuality problem opens the possibility to truly discuss a physical repre-
sentation of reality which goes beyond the classical representation of physics in
terms of an ASA. We are convinced that without a replacement of the problems
addressed in the literature there is no true possibility of discussing an interpre-
tation of QM which provides an objective non-classical physical representation
of reality. We know of no reasons to believe that this is not doable.
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